Argentina invading the Falkland Islands is not an impossibility

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The more troubling question is whether Britain retains the firepower to defend its territory, writes Lt Col Stuart Crawford

Argentina may lack the naval strength to retake the Falkland Islands, but its refurbished F-16 fighters and potential use of civilian vessels mean the threat cannot simply be dismissed.

The more troubling question is whether Britain retains the firepower to defend the islands — or mount another 1982-style task force if their defences are overwhelmed.

President Javier Milei has upped the ante once again over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands — "Las Malvinas" to Argentina—demanding they be “handed back” to the Government in Buenos Aires.

Britain has said the islands are British and will remain so for as long as that is the wish of the Islanders.

Leaving aside the fact Argentina has never actually owned the Falklands — and France and Spain arguably have stronger historical claims — why has Milei raised the issue again?

First, Argentina’s economy remains under considerable pressure. Nothing distracts attention from domestic difficulties quite like an external enemy or a powerful issue of national pride around which the population can be encouraged to rally.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Falklands could soon benefit from considerable oil reserves in their surrounding waters. Whoever controls the islands stands to gain from the jobs, investment, tax revenues and strategic influence that could follow.

That gives Argentina another reason to keep the dispute alive.

The question being asked by military and political commentators is whether Argentina is in any position to carry out its recurring threats to “retake” the islands.

The prevailing view is Argentina is much weaker militarily than it was when it invaded in 1982 and could not undertake such an operation today.

The Argentine Navy is a shadow of its former self and seemingly lacks the amphibious ships, escorts, logistics and air cover required to mount and sustain a conventional seaborne invasion.

Buenos Aires is acquiring 24 refurbished F-16 fighter aircraft from Denmark. These will significantly improve Argentina’s air-combat capability and may be equipped with weapons capable of threatening the aircraft defending the islands.

Others have pointed out China makes extensive use of civilian roll-on, roll-off ferries during military exercises, potentially rehearsing their use in any future operation against Taiwan.

The Falklands possess an extensive coastline, with numerous places where personnel, vehicles and equipment might be put ashore. Civilian vessels would not replace a proper amphibious fleet, but they could complicate British defence planning — particularly if used as part of a surprise operation.

Conventional wisdom holds Britain’s permanent military presence means the Falklands would be a far harder nut to crack than they were in 1982.

Some rather fanciful figures have circulated suggesting the UK has a full squadron of Typhoon fighters protecting the islands, supported by 1,500 troops, artillery and extensive air defences.

The islands are defended by four Typhoons, a relatively small military garrison and a Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel. Although these forces represent a far stronger first line of defence than existed before the 1982 invasion, they provide little margin for surprise, mechanical failure or a sustained assault.

A small number of aircraft can only be in one place at a time. They require functioning runways, fuel, weapons, engineers and secure communications. Disable any of those supporting elements and their effectiveness could be sharply reduced.

A limited garrison could also find itself stretched trying to protect the airfield, port, radar installations, settlements and vulnerable sections of coastline simultaneously.

The real question, therefore, is not merely whether Argentina could defeat the existing defenders.

It is what Britain could send — and how quickly — if those defences came under serious pressure.

Britain assembled and dispatched a remarkable naval task force in 1982. It included aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, submarines, landing ships, auxiliaries and requisitioned merchant vessels.

It was an extraordinary achievement of military planning, political will and civilian support.

The Royal Navy is far smaller than it was 44 years ago. Its surface fleet is stretched by existing commitments, while maintenance and availability problems continue to affect ships and submarines.

Britain could probably scrape together a carrier strike group, but doing so at short notice and sustaining it thousands of miles from home would be another matter.

There are also fewer suitable British merchant ships available for charter or requisition than there were in 1982. The famous “ships taken up from trade” were essential to the original campaign, carrying troops, helicopters, equipment, fuel and supplies.

Modern Britain has allowed much of that supporting maritime capacity to disappear.

That is why the more important question is not simply: does Argentina possess the firepower to take the Falklands?

It is: does Britain still possess the firepower, shipping and political resolve to stop it?

Do I believe Argentina is about to invade the Falklands? No. But I also did not expect to see an extended conventional war return to Europe during my lifetime. Recent history should have taught us unthinkable events can happen with alarming speed when political leaders detect weakness or hesitation. Deterrence works only when the potential aggressor believes that an attack will fail.

Four ageing Typhoons, a limited garrison and one patrol vessel may be sufficient in normal circumstances. They may not appear sufficient to an Argentine government facing domestic problems, seeking control of valuable natural resources and calculating Britain lacks the ability to respond decisively.

The best thing Prime Minister Andy Burnham could do now would be to fly an infantry battalion to the Falklands and reinforce the islands’ air and maritime defences.

That would not be an act of provocation. It would be an act of prevention.

An Argentine invasion remains unlikely. However, unlikely is not impossible — and the purpose of defence policy is to make certain unlikely never becomes tempting.