The next phase of this war could be fought on the ground, intelligence expert Ronald Sandee writes
In my last article, I argued that the US-Iran ceasefire should be seen as a pause, not a peace settlement.
President Trump has now said that the MOU with Iran is “completely dead”. He has humiliated the Iranian regime by calling them “thugs”, “liars” and “scum”. The Iranian are now talking about revenge and vengeance. It is clear now that the next phase of the war has begun.
Just look at the nature of recent American military strikes. Rather than focusing solely on Iran's coastline or retaliatory targets, the US has struck IRGC bases, airfields and logistics hubs deep inside the country, including in Bushehr, Sistan and Baluchestan, Kerman and Khuzestan.
These are not just punitive attacks. They are precisely the kind of military targets commanders seek to neutralise before introducing forces on the ground.
At the same time, Washington has continued to build up its ground force capabilities. Additional A-10 ground attack aircraft have been deployed to the Gulf, alongside airborne, marine and special operations forces specifically trained for rapid expeditionary missions.
Individually, none of these developments prove that ground operations are imminent. Taken together, these moves suggest that the US wants to preserve the option of ground operations.
That does not mean another Iraq-style full scale invasion. Iran is too vast, too mountainous and too heavily defended for such an operation. But there is a significant difference between an invasion and limited ground operations. That could be what the US is now planning. The Iranian regime is behaving like a government expecting something far more serious than another round of air strikes.
Following recent US attacks, the IRGC ordered emergency deployments of Basij units to Bushehr, Kerman and Sistan-Baluchestan. Even before those orders were issued, reinforcements had begun moving towards sensitive border regions. These deployments point to an Iranian leadership preparing for external military incursions and internal unrest.
The Basij are not conventional military units. They exist to suppress dissent, crush protests and prevent organised opposition from gaining momentum. Their deployment suggests the regime fears that any external military action could rapidly trigger an internal challenge to its authority.
Earlier this year, parts of a classified U.S. military planning document were leaked online. The plans outlined how American high readiness combat units could enter Iran to carry out limited, targeted missions. Those missions could include seizing nuclear sites, destroying IRGC bases, supporting anti-regime groups or preventing Tehran from moving its most sensitive assets.
A key target would almost certainly be Pickaxe Mountain. Believed to house some of Iran's most highly enriched uranium, it is one of the regime's most heavily guarded facilities. If Trump concludes that air strikes alone cannot destroy it, limited ground operations become a far more realistic option.
Power within Tehran is becoming more concentrated in the hands of the IRGC, recently proscribed by the UK, as rival factions compete for influence following the death of Ali Khamenei. Public divisions have become harder to conceal. Senior officials have faced open criticism during state ceremonies, while embarrassing security failures - including attacks close to Khamenei's burial in Mashhad - have exposed vulnerabilities that the regime would rather keep hidden.
Publicly, Tehran continues to pursue what its leaders openly describe as a "new regional order" and that ambition should concern the UK and the West. Iran has sought closer engagement with Saudi Arabia while simultaneously continuing to arm and finance proxy groups across the Middle East.
The Saudi government even published a commentary by the Iranian ambassador in Riyadh that made revolutionary statements and called for the destruction of Israel.
Riyadh's efforts to reduce tensions through diplomacy are misguided. The Islamic Republic has consistently used negotiations to buy time, expand its influence and strengthen its strategic position.
The recent funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei showed why Saudi Arabia should view Iran with huge scepticism. Despite months of Iranian-backed attacks on the Kingdom, a Saudi delegation travelled to Tehran to pay its respects. Yet during the ceremony, the Saudis were publicly humiliated as a Qur'anic verse was recited that cast them as the enemy rather than a partner. It was a calculated reminder that, despite the diplomatic smiles, Tehran's fundamental hostility has not changed.
President Trump may already have concluded that air strikes alone will not be enough. If he has, the next phase of this war could be fought on the ground.
