American political commentator Lee Cohen fears Andy Burnham's impact on the Special Relationship
No one will ever forget Donald Trump’s blunt judgement that Keir Starmer is "no Churchill".
Here in America, Starmer will be forever remembered as the PM who strained the Special Relationship to the extreme. The damage inflicted by Labour is real and measurable. Unfortunately there is little confidence his successor will prove much better vis-a vis the transatlantic alliance.
Starmer’s record is one of hesitation and impotence. On the biggest test of alliance loyalty in years, he chose to distance Britain rather than stand shoulder to shoulder.
That choice was not forced by circumstance. It was a deliberate signal that Labour under his leadership viewed the Special Relationship as optional rather than essential.
History shows the real partnership thrived when both sides were willing to act together, not when one side offered commentary from the sidelines. Starmer’s approach reversed that tradition.
His equivocation when the United States confronted Iran left Britain sidelined and irrelevant at a critical moment. While Washington acted decisively, Starmer’s Government rushed to declare it “played no role” in the strikes and defaulted to familiar talk of international law and de-escalation. The result was predictable: America carried the burden, Britain lost influence, and the alliance that once defined transatlantic power was reduced to something that now limps along on life support.
Good riddance to that version of leadership. Yet the relief at his departure should not turn into optimism for his successor is Andy Burnham. Americans have little reason to expect any meaningful repair in the short term.
Burnham has already shown where he stands on the current American administration. His public sneering at Donald Trump will not soon be forgotten. It was a calculated signal of hostility that plays well with certain domestic audiences but actively harms the relationship with the United States.
When a senior Labour figure treats the American president as a figure of ridicule rather than the leader of Britain’s most important ally, the message travels. It tells Washington that Britain’s political class remains more interested in scoring points against populism than in rebuilding practical cooperation on security, trade and shared threats.
Burnham’s broader instincts seem to align closely with the same pattern that defined Starmer’s tenure. There is no evidence he would reverse the drift on borders and security that has left Britain less cohesive and less reliable as a partner. The failures on migration, the visible rise in knife crime and street disorder, and the repeated prioritisation of ideology over public safety have all weakened Britain from within. These are not side issues.
A country struggling with uncontrolled inflows, strained services and declining trust in its own institutions carries less weight in Washington. Burnham has given no sign he would confront these problems with the urgency they require. If anything, his positioning suggests continuity with the same elite reluctance to acknowledge the scale of the challenge.
The deeper problem is structural. Starmer did not invent Labour’s discomfort with decisive alliance politics or firm border control. Those instincts run through the party. Replacing one leader with another from the same stable changes the face at the top but leaves the underlying assumptions intact. Burnham may present himself as a steadier or more moderate figure, yet on the issues that matter most to the Special Relationship he offers the same mix of hesitation abroad and weakness at home. That combination has already reduced Britain’s leverage. There is no credible reason to believe it will suddenly strengthen under new management.
From an American perspective the calculation is straightforward. The Special Relationship works best when Britain is confident in its sovereignty, secure in its borders and clear about its interests. Recent years have moved the country in the opposite direction. The United States can and will work with whatever government Britain elects, but effective partnership requires a counterpart that
is willing to act rather than posture. Starmer failed that test. Burnham shows every sign of failing it in the same way, perhaps with added personal friction toward the current administration in Washington.
I believe Britain still possesses the capacity, not only to restore a strong alliance, but to regain it’s former exceptionalism. That restoration will not come from swapping one Labour prime minister for another who shares the same fundamental outlook. It will require leadership prepared to put Britiain’s sovereignty, prosperity and security first and to treat the relationship with America as a vital necessity rather than a diplomatic accessory. Until that shift occurs, the damage Starmer inflicted will continue largely unchecked, regardless of who occupies Number Ten next.
The Special Relationship survived tense periods in the past because both countries eventually remembered what made it valuable.
The question now is whether Britain’s next leader is ready to remember. On current evidence, the answer is no.
