Russia has adapted to the era of grey-zone conflict but Britain has not, writes the British Army veteran and senior associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society
The Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich firing warning shots near a British civilian yacht in the Channel is the latest in a long line of provocations by Russia.
Individually, these actions are minor. Taken together, they point to something far more serious and dangerous.
The Kremlin will wrap the episode in procedural language: navigational safety, distance, and standard maritime conduct.
Britain should read the broader signal. A Russian warship chose to use force, however limited, near a British vessel in waters central to our security, commerce, and national prestige.
The timing gives the episode its political meaning. Last week, marines from the UK Commando Force seized the Russia-linked tanker Smyrtos in the Channel, part of the shadow fleet that Moscow uses to move oil around Western sanctions.
Now, a Russian frigate appeared in the same strategic theatre and fired warning shots near a British vessel.
Moscow understands theatre. It understands pressure and the value of intimidation calibrated just below the formal threshold of war.
That is the Russian method. Probe, threaten, deny, escalate by inches, then study the Western response. Ships in our waters, drones over Europe, cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, shadow tankers, spies and proxy networks are all part of the same campaign. The Kremlin wages conflict in what is known as the ‘grey zone’ because it has learned that modern democracies struggle to respond to aggression delivered in fragments.
Britain needs to name the campaign clearly. Russia treats us as an adversary. Its hostility extends to our seas, infrastructure, politics, energy security and alliances. The Channel incident belongs within that wider pattern.
For years, Britain has spoken in the language of a great military power while allowing the hard instruments of national power to grow thin.
The Royal Navy is asked to monitor hostile vessels, enforce sanctions, protect undersea infrastructure, reassure allies, defend trade routes, and patrol home waters, all with a fleet stretched across too many tasks.
Russia recognises that gap and identifies the pressure points. It sees a country generous and resolute in its support for Ukraine, yet underpowered in the day-to-day contest closer to home.
Backing Ukraine remains one of the most effective strategic choices Britain can make. Every Russian missile system, ammunition depot, aircraft and armoured vehicle destroyed in Ukraine weakens the same war machine that threatens Europe. Helping Kyiv fight is a direct investment in British security.
Yet Ukraine policy needs to be part of a broader national strategy for sub-threshold warfare. Britain needs greater naval capacity, tougher enforcement of sanctions, stronger protection for critical infrastructure, faster attribution of hostile activity, and meaningful consequences for states that test us.
The central point is simple. Russia has adapted to the era of grey-zone conflict. Britain has not. We must adapt more quickly.
The Channel is our front door. When a Russian warship fires near a British vessel, the proper response is strategic seriousness. Moscow is already acting like an enemy. Britain should start acting like a country determined to defend itself and defeat them. That starts with properly funding and equipping our Armed Forces.